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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Defendant Aneudi Marquez appeals his sentence on one count of conspiring to 
distribute cocaine, arguing that the District Court erred by imposing a sentence of 70 
months’ imprisonment.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In September 2009, Defendant Aneudi Marquez agreed with two other individuals, 
Rafael Alvarez and Nolly Paulino, to purchase cocaine from a DEA confidential 
informant (“CI”).1  The operation began in 2009 when Paulino and an unidentified 
individual negotiated to buy 50 kilograms of cocaine for $1,200,000 from the CI and an 
undercover officer.  Paulino and his colleague apparently told the CI and the undercover 
officer that they would need to check with their boss prior to purchasing the cocaine.  
Soon after, Marquez, Paulino, and Alvarez traveled to Cherry Hill, New Jersey to 
meet with the CI.  After an argument ensued as to the proposed location of the 
transaction, a coffee shop, Marquez said that he did not need to deal with the CI.  The 
three men then left and began driving toward New York in two separate vehicles, a Ford 
Escape and a Volkswagen Jetta.  Shortly thereafter, authorities pulled both vehicles over 
on the highway.  At that time, Paulino had $600,000 in heat-sealed plastic bags under the 
seat of his SUV.  Marquez, who was riding in the Volkswagen with Alvarez, had what 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 
jurisdiction over the challenge to the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
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appeared to be a drug ledger, which contained detailed accounts of various drug deals, 
including drug amounts purchased and debts owed.   
All three men were arrested, and Marquez pled guilty to one count of conspiring to 
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine.  At his sentencing 
hearing, he argued for a three-level downward adjustment to his sentence.  To that end, he 
conceded that U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 may not apply to the court’s sentencing analysis, but 
nevertheless urged the court to consider the uncompleted nature of the crime when 
determining his sentence under the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.2  After 
considering the arguments of the parties, the District Court sentenced Marquez to a 
bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment. 
On appeal, Marquez relies upon § 2X1.1(b), arguing that he was entitled to a 
three-level sentencing reduction because the court failed to consider as a factor the 
uncompleted nature of the crime.  He further contends that his sentence was substantively 
unreasonable, even though he received a bottom-of-the-Guidelines range 70 month 
sentence.  In response, the government argues that Marquez waived his § 2X1.1 argument 
by abandoning it in the District Court, and that his sentence was substantively reasonable 
given, among other things, the nature of his involvement in the conspiracy.   
II. DISCUSSION 
                                              
2 Section 2X1.1, entitled “Conspiracies, Attempt, Solicitation (Not Covered by a 
Specific Offense Guideline),” provides for a three-level reduction in the offense level if 
the co-conspirators did not “complete[] all the acts [they] believed necessary on their part 
for the successful completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances demonstrate 
that the conspirators were about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or 
interruption by some similar event beyond their control.”  U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2). 
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Whether a defendant has waived a claim of error through abandonment can be 
determined by this Court in the first instance.3  Here, the record suggests that Marquez’s 
counsel disclaimed the applicability of § 2X1.1(b) to warrant a three-level sentencing 
reduction before the District Court.4  Thus, there is reason to conclude that Marquez 
waived reliance on this argument on appeal.5  However, we need not decide this issue, for 
even if we were to determine that this argument had not been waived, we also conclude 
that Marquez’s reliance on § 2X1.1(b) is misplaced.   
U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(c)(1) provides that “When an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy 
is expressly covered by another offense guideline section, apply that guideline section.”  
The commentary to Section 2X1.1 also provides a list of “[o]ffense guidelines that 
expressly cover conspiracies,” which includes § 2D1.1.6  Moreover, the title of § 2D1.1 
states categorically that the guideline covers “Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, 
Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit these Offenses); 
                                              
3 See, e.g., United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 674 (3d Cir. 1993).   
4 Although Marquez reserved the right to argue for a three-level sentencing reduction 
under § 2X1.1 in his plea deal, Marquez’s counsel agreed “more or less” with the District 
Court’s statement during Marquez’s sentencing hearing that “because there’s a specific 
provision for a drug conspiracy 2X1.1 doesn’t apply.”  (App. at 27-28.) 
5 See United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2013) (defendant waived 
claim on appeal where he had conceded same in his motion before the district court); 
Console, 13 F.3d at 674 (claim that was expressly abandoned at sentencing hearing could 
not be raised on appeal); United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1209 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(defendant could not raise on appeal a claim that his attorney conceded in district court). 
6 U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, cmt. n.1; see also Watterson v. United States, 219 F.3d 232, 236 
n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) (“section 2D1.1 and 2D1.2 clearly indicate that they are intended to 
apply both to substantive violations of the statutory provisions upon which they are 
premised and to conspiratorial and attempted violations thereof.”). 
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Attempt or Conspiracy.”7  Based on these provisions, we conclude that the plain text of 
the Guidelines dictates the application of § 2D1.1 on the facts presented, and therefore 
Marquez’s argument is meritless.8  In consequence, the District Court did not err when it 
declined to grant a three-level sentencing reduction under § 2X1.1(b). 
Finally, Marquez claims that his bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence of 70 
months’ imprisonment was substantively unreasonable.9 Absent any significant 
procedural error, we must “give due deference to the district court’s determination that 
the 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the sentence.”10  We find Marquez’s final 
argument unavailing.  In fact, the record is replete with evidence suggesting: (1) that 
Marquez and his co-conspirators had $600,000 in heat-sealed packs ready to purchase the 
cocaine; (2) that Marquez communicated with the CI with an intent to complete the drug 
deal; (3) and that the only reason that Marquez did not complete the deal was because he 
“believed the ‘seller’ was in fact associated with law enforcement.”11  Moreover, we find 
it telling that Marquez was later arrested while a fugitive after an indictment had issued 
charging him with one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and a magistrate judge 
had issued a warrant for his arrest on that same charge.  In short, Marquez’s Guidelines 
                                              
7 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. 
8 See United States v. Onheiber, 173 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 1999) (§ 2X1.1 does 
not apply to drug attempts or conspiracies governed by U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1). 
9 We review a district court’s “broad discretion in imposing a sentence” for 
“unreasonableness,” under an abuse of discretion standard of review.  United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
10 Id. at 568 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
11 Def. Br. at 16. 
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sentence was completely reasonable given his involvement in the conspiracy and the 
strong evidence that he intended, from the outset, to complete the deal.  In consequence, 
we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a bottom-of-
the-Guidelines-range sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment.   
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above and otherwise persuasively stated by the District 
Court, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
